The political and economic impact of country size has been a frequently discussed issue in social science. In accordance with the general hypothesis of Montesquieu, this paper demonstrates that there is a robust negative relationship between the size of country territory and a measure of the rule of law for a large cross-section of countries. We propose that there are two main reasons for this regularity; …rstly that institutional quality often has the character of a local public good that is imperfectly spread across space from the capital to the hinterland, and secondly that a large territory usually is accompanied by valuable rents that tend to distort property rights institutions. Our empirical analysis further shows that whether the capital is centrally or peripherally located within the country matters for the average level of rule of law.
Introduction
We demonstrate that there is a robust negative relationship between the size of country territory and the strength of rule of law for a large cross-section of countries. We also show that the internal location of the capital matters for the geographical spreading of institutions. In the spirit of Montesquieu, we argue that there are two basic reasons for these results; …rstly that large countries tend to be endowed with sizeable potential rents that distort the incentives of the regime, and secondly that the rule of law has the character of a local public good that is imperfectly broadcast from the country capital to the hinterland.
The importance of country size for social development has been a topic among political philosophers for centuries. Both Plato and Aristotle preceded Montesquieu arguing that small nations like the Greek city states were naturally superior to larger entities and that a country's entire territory should not be larger than that it could be surveyed from a hill. Likewise, Rousseau later claimed that small states prosper "...simply because they are small, because all their citizens know each other and keep an eye on each other, and because their rulers can see for themselves the harm that is being done and the good that is theirs to do..." (Rousseau, quoted in Rose, 2005) .
The opposite argument, that the diversity of preferences and the e¤ects of fractionalization are more easily handled within large countries, was proposed by both David Hume and James Madison. 1 Later in ‡uential works like Dahl and Tufte (1973) and Alesina and Spolaore (2003) have tended to think of the problem as encompassing a trade-o¤ where small countries have advantages in terms of democratic participation and preference homogeneity, whereas smallness on the other hand implies higher per capita costs of non-rival public goods, a small internal market, and that small countries easily might be partitioned or swallowed by larger countries with a greater military capacity. The latter argument appears to have been particularly relevant for the European continent (Tilly, 1990) .
Within the economics discipline, the relationship between country size and economic performance has not rendered a lot of attention. Early endogenous growth models like Romer (1990) and Aghion and Howitt (1992) included a prediction that larger countries should grow faster because they had a larger pool of potential innovators. On the whole, these early models did not receive strong empirical support. 2 Alesina et al (1998) show that large countries tend to have large governments and that they are less open to trade than smaller countries. Using the level of the population as the measure of country size, Rose (2005) fails to …nd any systematic e¤ect of size on a range of institutional and economic performance variables. Dahl and Tufte (1973) is probably the most comprehensive study of the importance of country size and is one of few studies that actually considers country area as a potential determinant of economic outcomes.
A few articles focus on the endogenous determination of country size. In Friedman (1977) , it is assumed that the size of tax revenues increases with country territory and that tax revenue-maximizing rulers therefore invest in extending their territory. In the end, this process will actually result in an equilibrium where rulers maximize their joint potential net revenue.
In Spolaore (1997, 2003) , country size is endogenously determined as a result of a trade-o¤ where large countries have economies of scale in public goods provision but a greater degree of preference heterogeneity. Wittman (2000) extends this framework by allowing for migration between countries in the spirit of Tiebout (1956) .
The generality of the endogenous borders literature has been questioned by Herbst (2000) . 3 Although the endogenous borders literature is useful for understanding the European experience or developments over the very long run, it appears to have less to o¤er an analysis of politics in former colonies where borders were usually …xed by colonial powers and subsequently rarely changed. Indeed, Herbst argues that the exogenously given and more or less random con…guration of borders in Africa must be a central feature in 2 Kremer's (1993) extreme long-run analysis of population growth on di¤erent continents is sometimes viewed as giving some support to the 'scale-e¤ect' prediction, but it was e¤ectively refuted by the evidence in Jones (1995) and led to the development of growth models without scale e¤ects. 3 In Herbst's (2000, p 141) own words: "...the intertia of the national experience and the incentives posed by international structures and norms that have developed over time combine to make the demarcation of the state a non-issue in most countries most of the time. Here, I di¤er greatly from writings by economists who seek to …nd the optimal number of states by assuming that states cooperate to design themselves in a way that will maximize 'their joint potential net revenue' [Friedman] or who believe that the size and shape of states is determined on the basis of majority votes motivated by precise calculations of economic interests [Alesina and Spolaore]" comparative analyses of African politics.
In this article, we show that the size of country territory is negatively associated with a range of institutional measures such as rule of law, political stability, and corruption when using a sample of all countries in the world. We recognize however that boundaries are potentially endogenous and therefore restrict our analysis to former colonies whose borders were exogenously determined by the colonial powers. In a theoretical section, we argue that country size has two e¤ects: Firstly, that a large territory means a larger absolute value of expected rents from lands and mines and that this stock of appropriable treasures makes self-interested autocratic rulers less interested in upholding strong private property rights and protection against expropriation. Secondly, that the strong concentration of power in the capitals of former colonies implies that public goods like the rule of law di¤use according to a spatial decay-function so that the levels felt in the hinterland are much weaker than in the capitals. This problem should be further exacerbated in countries where the capital is non-centrally located.
As the base sample for testing our hypotheses, we use data from 127 former colonies which -unlike most of the previous literature on colonialism -arguably contains all large and small countries that were ever colonized.
We show that the size of country territory has a very robust negative impact on our measure of the rule of law, even after controlling for distance from the equator, openness to trade, settler mortality, ethnic fractionalization, colonial origin, continental dummies, and a number of other variables. We also show that country territory appears to have a stronger association with rule of law than the level of the population. This fact, together with the general endogeneity of population size to institutions, suggest to us that country territory is a more appropriate indicator of country size than population. Unlike any other study that we are aware of, we further construct two indicators of the peripherality of the capital. As hypothesized, it turns out that when we hold country territory and some other controls constant, the strength of rule of law decreases with our size-neutral measure of the peripherality of the capital. Our interpretation of these results is that exogenously determined country territory has been a major impediment to the creation of strong institutions in large countries like Indonesia, Sudan, and Algeria, whereas it has been highly bene…cial to small countries like Bahrain, Martinique, and Singapore. The article is organized as follows: In section two, we give a general outline of the statistical correlations between country size and various indicators of institutional quality. In section three, we develop a theoretical framework for understanding the linkages between size and institutions. In section four, we provide the main empirical investigation using the reduced sample of former colonies. Section …ve concludes the exposition.
Country Size and Institutions
Country size is negatively associated with a range of measures of institutional quality. In Table 1, we use six di¤erent measures as As Table 1 shows, the coe¢ cient for LogArea is negative and highly significant for all six dependent institutional variables. LogArea has its strongest impact on Rule of Law and Political Stability. In the latter case, LogA-rea alone explains roughly 25 percent of the variation, which we think is a quite remarkable result but perhaps not surprising. It seems for instance natural that a large country is more likely to host rebel movements than small ones. However, the …t is substantially improved when we include Latitude, which measures absolute distance from the equator in latitude degrees, and a dummy for Neo-Europe which captures the in ‡uence of four outliers The reduced form regressions in Table 1 show that country size seems to be strongly correlated with various types of institutional quality. However, the estimates do not tell us much about the causal mechanisms behind the results. Indeed, we suspect that the precise causal mechanism depends on what particular institutional variable we are considering. Therefore, we will henceforth focus more deeply on the variable that has attracted the greatest interest in the literature; Rule of law.
Another issue concerns the potential endogeneity of country size. In the theoretical model of Alesina and Spolaore (1997) , country size is endogenously determined as a result of a trade-o¤ between economies of scale in public goods provision and preference heterogeneity among the population.
All else equal, large countries tend to have low costs per capita of public goods (like rule of law) but also people in the periphery who would prefer a di¤erent government policy. If this model is correct, then it would be inappropriate to include LogArea as an exogenous variable as in Table 1 .
The generality of Alesina and Spolaore's view on country formation has been questioned by Herbst (2000) . Although the type of process envisaged by Alesina and Spolaore probably has been in place in Europe and parts of Asia where country formation has been going on for centuries or even millennia, the same cannot be said of the former colonies in America and Africa that received independence much more recently. Herbst (2000) argues that for Africa in particular, the size and number of countries was organized in a more or less random manner during the infamous Berlin conference of 1885. First of all there was relatively little a priori information for boundary creators due to a lack of traditional boundaries as well as natural geographic boundaries. Ultimately, the Berlin conference made it possible to claim sovereignty over an area regardless of the ability to administer the area.
Therefore, there was no discrimination enabling only the more powerful colonizers to claim large areas. The logic of the partition was primarily to serve European strategic interests and the colonial powers more or less ignored existing state structures and ethnic boundaries (Pakenham, 1991) . 4 Indeed, the wider e¤ects of the random nature of African borders has been a major topic among Africanists (Davidson, 1992; Englebert et al, 2002) . The endogeneity of borders can also be questioned for the other former colonies, although there are some examples of country break-ups after independence. 5 The implication of the discussion above is that while it might be problematic to consider country size as fully exogenous in Europe and parts of Asia, this should not constitute a serious problem for former colonies. In the further theoretical and empirical analysis, we will therefore only consider the relationship between country size and rule of law in countries that were previously colonized.
A Theoretical Framework
In the model below, we aim to describe certain features of the political economy and institutional environment of a former colony with exogenous, randomly distributed borders instituted by the previous colonial power. 6 The size of country territory is imagined to have two e¤ects on the average level of rule of law: Firstly, a direct 'broadcasting-e¤ect'that derives from many formal institutions'character of a local public good originating in the 4 In Jackson and Rosberg's (1985, p 46) words: "The boundaries of many countries, particularly but by no means exclusively in French-speaking Africa, were arbitrarily drawn by the colonial powers and were not encouraging frameworks of uni…ed, legitimate, and capable states." 5 Well-known incidences of break-ups of colonies include the formation of India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh in 1949 and of Colombia, Venezuela, and Ecuador in 1830. However, all the countries mentioned had their break-up in conjunction with or very soon after independence and post-colonial developments have therefore had at most a very small impact on border formation. 6 The model is not at all intended to capture the situation in the Neo-European former colonies. As in the empirical section, the historical trajectories of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States are anomalies to the theory below. country capital. Secondly, an indirect 'rent seeking-e¤ect'such that larger countries tend to be endowed with a larger amount of primary sector rents, which in turn decreases government incentives towards maintaining strong property rights.
The Broadcasting E¤ect
We propose that rule of law has the basic character of a local public good that emanates from the capital of the country and where the e¤ective level of the good declines with geographical distance from the capital. As noted above, we see a number of reasons for making this assumption.
Firstly, it is a very common assertion in the literature that both executive and legislative power in the newly independent colonies tended to originate almost exclusively from the capitals (Bates, 1981; Herbst, 2000) .
Following the old colonial logic, whoever controlled the capital was usually also internationally recognized as the legitimate regime. Given the lack of democracy and the non-existence of strong regional identities or federal states, the maintenance of rule of law remained highly centralized. 7 Secondly, it is also often discussed how the 'broadcasting of power over space' in former colonies is associated with signi…cant challenges, particularly in Africa (Herbst, 2000) . Public goods like the legislation and enforcement of property rights were most strongly felt in and around the capital among the elite groups that controlled the state. In this sense, we argue that institutions tend to be local public goods in a similar sense as for instance knowledge production and R&D.
Thirdly, even if the broadcasting of institutions had been smooth across geography, it is usually the case that the sympathy for the ruling elite and its laws decrease with distance from the capital. Alesina and Spolaore (1997) make a similar assumption but with the size of the population rather than geographical distance as the source of preference discordance. In any case, distance from the capital should be negatively associated with the strength of law enforcement and with the willingness of local people to comply with the rules endorsed by the elite in the capital.
In order to formalize this idea, let us imagine that the strength of rule of law in the capital of country i is given by a variable z i . Let us also imagine, as in Alesina and Spolaore (1997) , that the size and location of countries in the world can be described as non-overlapping intervals on the real line where s i > 0 is the size of country i and where
de…nes the unique country location with l i > 0 as the 'coordinate' for the left-hand side border. 8 The capital of the country, in turn, is located at . We further make the implicit assumption that within countries, the population is randomly distributed across space.
As discussed above, we postulate that the strength of rule of law diminishes with distance from the capital according to a spatial decay-function
where z i;j is the level of rule of law at location l i;j and where a i > 0 is a parameter describing the marginal decline in institutional quality over space.
The level of a i is assumed to be such that a i s i < 1. 9
If we de…ne the average distance to the capital within a country as d i ,
we can calculate this measure as a weighted average
This distance function can assume two extreme values. The …rst is given by the situation when the capital is located exactly in the middle of the country so that c i = l i + s i =2. In this case, simple algebra shows that
In the other extreme case with the capital located at either of the two borders, we will have that d i = s i 2 . We can thus describe average distance more generally as
where q i 2 [0; 1] is a size-neutral index of the 'peripherality' of the capital where a high q i indicates a location near (or at) a border and where a low q i means a location near (or at) the center of the country.
The Rent Seeking-E¤ect
The level of institutional quality in the capital z i is to a large extent given by the colonial and pre-colonial history of the country, as argued by North In order to capture both of these features, we make a distinction between historical (pre-colonial and colonial) property rights institutions with an average strength of x and endogenously determined current (post-colonial) institutions z. After independence, discontinuous breaks with the colonial regime were often made, which is the reason why we think of x and z as di¤erent variables. However, as will be shown, the choice of z will partly depend on the historical level x.
We propose that autocratic post-colonial regimes typically faced a tradeo¤ between fostering strong or weak property rights institutions, i.e. a high or a low level of z. Strong property rights and a pervasive rule of law tended to favor the growth of a modern, export-oriented manufacturing sector that was dependent on highly mobile foreign investments and capital.
However, a strong rule of law also served as a signi…cant constraint on the regime and made rent extraction from a primary sector more di¢ cult. 10 The 1 0 We recognize of course that all former colonies are not characterized by nondemocratic, self-interested rulers that maximize their own rents. However, we strongly believe that this generalization is more appropriate for this category of countries than it would be to include a benevolent social planner. Our model has some similarities to the primary sector in our model includes industries such as agriculture as well as various types of mineral extraction, including oil. The common feature of these economic activities is that they rely on a highly immobile factor of production (land and mines) and therefore tend to be less sensitive to the institutional environment in the country. 11 Furthermore, there is generally a positive relationship between the magnitude of primary sector rents and the area of the country. 12 We capture this reasoning formally by modelling a utility function for an autocratic ruling regime of the following appearance:
The regime receives utility from private rents from manufacturing m and from a primary sector r. x i measures the level of institutional quality given by colonial and pre-colonial history, whereas z i indicates the endogenously created institutions after independence. The parameter b i re ‡ects the relative weight given to the primary sector in country i for historical or for power strategic reasons not explained by the model. 13 In line with the discussion above, we assume that The least sensitive type of natural resource production is probably low tech mining of for instance alluvial diamonds and gold. Such mining has often prevailed in Africa even during periods of a general institutional collapse (Olsson, 2005) . It should be acknowledged that certain types of natural resource production -like oil drilling and o¤-shore diamond mining -typically involves advanced technology and a dependency on foreign capital, as in the manufacturing sector.
percentage of revenue expropriated in the two sectors from 5 to 4 percent.
In the manufacturing sector, which relies on internationally mobile capital and investments, this good signal has a strong impact on total production that increases to 130. The e¤ective level of rents therefore actually increases to become 5.2 units. In the primary sector, with highly immobile investments, production increases but only by a relatively small amount to 110 units. E¤ective primary sector rents fall from 5 to 4.4 units. In this representative example, manufacturing rents thus turn out to have a positive relationship with the strength of property rights, whereas the reverse is true in the primary sector. 14 We further make the implicit assumption that natural resources are distributed randomly over space, which implies that the absolute level of expected primary sector rents increases with the territory of the country. In order to avoid extra notation, we capture this idea by simply assuming
The same e¤ect of space is not present in the manufacturing sector. All else equal, the utility of the regime thus always increases with territory. 15 The logic of the model further suggests that the marginal utility of extra territory should decrease with the strength of the rule of law since rent appropriation by the elite is more di¢ cult if private property rights are strong, implying
The historical experience given by x i shapes expectations about current behavior and exacerbates the marginal impact of a current institutional policy. In the numerical example above, the decrease in expropriation risk from 5 to 4 percent implied an increase in revenues with 30 units. In a country with favorable historical institutions, the reaction of an identical change in expropriation risk should be even greater, maybe increasing production to 150 and rents to 6 units. Likewise, production in the primary sector should be more responsive to a current institutional change, maybe increasing to 120 rather than to 110. Rents would then be 4.8 rather than 4.4. In other words, a stronger institutional heritage means that the positive marginal e¤ect of increasing z i increases with x i in the manufacturing 1 4 Note, however, that a rational rent-maximizing regime (with bi = 1) would never choose to carry out this strengthening of institutions since the overall e¤ect is a fall in rents from 10 to 9.6 units. 1 5 If size had been a choice variable, all autocratic rulers in our model would thus have liked to increase the size of their country but would of course have been constrained by a similar desire among other dictatorial rulers, as in Friedman (1977) .
sector, whereas the negative marginal e¤ect of increasing z i decreases with Unlike in the framework of Alesina and Spolaore (1997), the choice variable in our model is the quality of a public good like the rule of law rather than country size. Another di¤erence is that we do not believe that it is natural to assume economies of scale in public goods provision when area is the measure of country size. For simplicity, we also abstract from the costs of institutional change. 16 The only constraint facing the regime is that the rule of law must not fall below a certain reservation level z min . If it does, the people will overthrow the incumbent.
The ruling regime thus faces an optimization problem
If we disregard the possibility of a boundary solution, the (interior) equilibrium level of rule of law or property rights institutions z i is implicitly
given by the …rst-order condition m z + b i r z = 0: In order to have an interior solution, it is further required that the second-order condition for maximum
Since we have already established that the denominator must be negative, it will be the case that @z i @s i < 0. We argue that this type of indirect negative 1 6 The cost of institutional change is explicitly modelled in Congdon Fors and Olsson (2005) . Naturally, costs of institutional change would imply that there is a bias toward keeping the institutions inherited from colonial days.
relationship between institutional quality and territorial size is similar in spirit to what Montesquieu had in mind. We can also easily see that
The equations above imply that the average strength of rule of law in a country i will be given by: 17
The central insight from this expression is that rule of law will diminish with country size via two potential channels. The …rst direct 'broadcasting- are very small both in terms of population and territory (for instance Nauru with a population of roughly 12,000 individuals on 21 square kilometers) and some are still dependencies to their old colonial powers. Many cross-country studies exclude such tiny countries, but given the issue at hand, they are relevant observations in our study. 18 Our sample is by far the largest sample of former colonies in the literature and arguably includes all countries that were ever colonized.
The basic equation that we test in this section with many variations is given in (7)
where Z i is the measure of Rule of law in country i, S i is our country size variable (mainly LogArea), Q i is our measure of the peripherality of the capital in the country, C 0 i is a vector of control variables, i is the normally distributed error term, and k (with k = f0; 1; 2; 3g) are the estimated coe¢ cients.
The main variable of interest here is of course S i . We do not believe that it is practically possible to disentangle empirically a direct and an indirect e¤ect of country size as in eq. (6) and we therefore only specify a reducedform relationship in (7). Our hypothesis is obviously that 1 < 0. The peripherality measure Q i is our equivalent of q i in (6): We are not aware of any other study that has tried to measure or estimate the impact of the peripherality of the capital on institutions or indeed on any other economic variable. We expect to …nd that 2 < 0. The control variables in C 0 i will always include Latitude and Neo-Europe as in Table 1 , but also a number of other variables suggested in the literature. The motivation for including Latitude is partially that it can be regarded as a proxy for the marginal 'spatial cost' of broadcasting institutions, a i . 19 A Neo-Europe-dummy is included since these four countries are extreme outliers and do not …t well into our basic framework. We will also include various proxies for colonial institutions x i such that Acemoglu et al´s (2001) Settler Mortality-variable, although this reduces our number of observations by almost one half. Lastly, b i will be considered as a deep parameter that we do not attempt to control for.
The Size Variable
Before we carry out our basic task of estimating (7), we will make a digression on what country size variable S i that should be included. In the tradition of Spolaore (1997, 2003 ) most studies have used the level of the population as the indicator of country size. In a recent paper, Rose (2005) investigates whether the level of the population has an impact on a battery of economic and institutional variables and …nds that it has no or, at best, a very weak e¤ect. We argue that unlike country area, the level of the population is in general endogenous to economic and institutional environments, sometimes even in the short run. 20 Nonetheless, we include the level of the population as a regressor in Table 2 to check whether country area or population size can best explain variations in the rule of law.
To begin with, column (1) shows that LogArea is still a very strong predictor of Rule of law even in this sample, and together with the two primary controls (with unreported but highly signi…cant estimates as in Table 1 ), it explains nearly 54 percent of the variation in the dependent variable (see Figure 3 for a partial scatter plot). If we were to interpret these results, a 100 percent increase in total area for any country would imply a reduction in the Rule of Law -index by 0.169 points, which translates into about 3.9 percent of the whole dispersion between the highest possible score and the lowest possible score. This relatively small e¤ect is explained by that countries di¤er drastically in size. 21 If we instead compare a country with a total area of 1,000 square kilometers (about the size of Hong Kong) with a country with an area of 1,000,000 square kilometers (like Mauretania or Bolivia), the model predicts that all else equal the larger country should have a score on Rule of law that is 1.17 points lower, which is clearly a large e¤ect.
Column (2) shows that LogPop (the natural logarithm of the level of the 2 0 There are several recent examples of episodes when the population has changed drastically as a result of institutional failures. In 1994, 800,000 Tutsi were slaughtered in Rwanda as a result of a collapse of the rule of law. The older experiences of Nazi Germany and Stalin's Soviet Union are well-known examples of how bad institutions have a very large impact on the level of the population. 2 1 India, one of the largest countries in our sample, is about 130'000 times larger than Macau, which is one of the smallest countries in our sample. population) is also negative and signi…cant when included alone, but its explanatory power is much lower. 22 When included together with LogArea in column (5), LogPop is insigni…cant and changes sign whereas LogArea has almost exactly the same coe¢ cient as before. Given the high correlation between LogArea and LogPop, one should of course not take the speci…c estimate seriously, but column (5) appears to indicate that even when holding population constant, Rule of law diminishes with country territory and retains its signi…cance. Table 2 also includes two other variables that are believed to be strongly associated with country size; population density in logs (LogPopDens) and a measure of the country's degree of openness (LogOpen) where the latter is measured in the conventional way as imports plus exports as a share of GDP. 23 One might expect that a public good like the rule of law is more e¢ ciently spread in a country with a high average population density in its territory. Column (3) con…rms that LogPopDens is positively related to Rule of law. Of course, since population density is calculated as total population divided by total area, it does not make sense to run LogPopDens against LogArea.
A third variable that is highly related to country size is Openness. Table 2 suggests that a high degree of openness appears to act as a disciplining device for countries to uphold strong property rights and judicial constraints against opportunistic behavior by governments and individuals. The estimate in column (4) is positive and highly signi…cant and the estimate is still significant when LogArea is included in column (6). This does not much a¤ect the negative estimate for LogArea.
Lastly, in column (7) we consider the idea that territorial size might actually in part determine the level of the population. In a two-stage procedure, we …rst run a regression with LogPop as the dependent variable and LogArea as the regressor. We then use the residuals from this estimation as the independent variable and Rule of law as the dependent one. We thus exploit the variation in the level of the population that is not explained by country area. The estimate for LogPop in column (7) is then negative but non-signi…cant.
The main conclusion from Table 2 is that LogArea is the superior predictor of Rule of Law among the size-related measures. We recognize however that the chain of causality might partially run through LogPop, LogPopDens, and Openness to institutional quality. In the remaining estimations, we will run regressions where we do not include the other three size indicators but where the reasoning above should be kept in mind.
The Centrality of the Capital
Apart from the size of country territory, the degree of peripherality of the capital q i is a key ingredient in our theory and in our empirical model. The model predicts that rule of law should decrease with q i , holding country size s i constant. Hence, we also expect a negative sign of 2 in (7). Using data from CEPII (2006) and CIA (2005), we have constructed a measure of the distance in kilometers from the approximate center of the country to the city hosting the seat of the government (which is usually also the capital). 24 The measure is available for 120 countries in our ex-colony sample. The countries with the greatest distances are not surprisingly the United States and Canada. The natural logarithm of this score makes up LogDistance, which is featured in Table 3 . When run together with LogArea, LogDistance is negative and signi…cant in column (1), and strongly signi…cant in column (2) when featured alone. The distance measure is clearly correlated with country area (larger countries like Brazil and Indonesia will, ceteris paribus, have a greater absolute distance from center to capital), and the coe¢ cient in column (2) where LogArea is excluded presumably picks up some of the e¤ect of country size. Furthermore, LogDistance is clearly an imperfect proxy for q i in the theory section which is a size-neutral index of the peripherality of the capital.
We have therefore created a measure that, we believe, more clearly re‡ects the degree of peripherality. We have done so by dividing our calculated distance from center to capital by an approximate measure of the distance from the center of the country to the border, where we approximate the shape of all countries to be congruent to a circle as is common in the trade literature (Head and Meyer, 2002) (see Data Appendix for the details). This size-adjusted measure Periphery shows countries like Namibia and Costa Rica as being among the very lowest scorers whereas the countries with the most peripheral capitals include Mozambique and Benin. Figure 4 illustrates the peripherality measure with respect to Namibia (with a score of 0.125) and Mozambique (1.77).
The model predicts that the strength of rule of law should increase with q i holding s i constant, and in column (3) we try to accomplish a similar scenario. As hypothesized, Periphery has a negative coe¢ cient and is signi…cant (column 3) as well as when featured alone (column 4), although these results are somewhat sensitive to the inclusion of Somalia. LogArea remains negative and highly signi…cant throughout all speci…cations. The results in Table 3 , column 3 predicts that when controlling for area, the country with the most uncentrally located capital should have a Rule of Law level that is 0.54 points lower (equivalent to 13 percent lower) than a country with a perfectly centrally located capital. In summary, we believe that Table 3 provides supporting evidence of the notion that the geographical peripherality of the capital should matter for the average intensity of public goods like the rule of law.
Other determinants
In Table 4 , we extend our set of control variables in C 0 i from just Latitude and Neo-Europe to include several other variables that have been suggested in the literature. Ethnic, cultural, and or religious fractionalization is an often argued cause for di¤erences in institutional quality and civil con ‡ict (see for Further variables related to geography and natural resource endowments are included in Table 5 . Controlling for Island countries (de…ned as countries with no land border), Landlocked countries, and Dependency countries (countries that are not sovereign), does not alter the signi…cance of the coe¢ cient for LogArea. The negative relation between the size of nations and Rule of Law is therefore not driven by small islands or dependency countries. Column 4 also shows that the coe¢ cient for LogArea is still negative and signi…cant when including dummies for Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America.
Furthermore Table 5 shows that the negative relationship between LogArea and Rule of Law is also robust while controlling for natural resource abundance. Column 5 includes countries which are major Oil exporters as well as countries where Diamonds were discovered prior to 1989, and Column 6 controls for the ratio between energy and mineral depletion as a share of GNI.
Although not shown, it is important to note that in the regression results above, Neo-Europe and Latitude are included in every regression. The regressions above would also be robust to the inclusion LogOpenness.
Further Robustness Tests
The last three columns of Table 5 to exclude those countries with a standard error larger than 0.2. This turns out to be almost the same as excluding those countries with less than six independent sources 28 . As can be seen from Column 8, excluding countries with a standard error larger than 0.2, while also controlling for Islands, Dependency, Neo-Europe, and Latitude, the coe¢ cient for LogArea is still negative and signi…cant.
The last regression in Table 5 Furthermore, the estimated coe¢ cient for LogArea in Table 2 , column 1, is not statistically di¤erent from any of the estimates coe¢ cients from Table 4 or Table 5 . We believe that these results strongly indicate that the territorial size of nations is an important determinant of the rule of law and of institutional choice in general.
Conclusions
In the spirit of Montesquieu, this paper demonstrates that there is a clear, and Rule of Law is even robust to including the level of the population, suggesting that country area is a stronger predictor of institutional quality than population levels. We believe that these results strongly suggest that large countries are seriously disadvantaged in the formation and maintenance of institutions for economic development.
In our model, we further propose that the centrality of the capital should play a vital role in the broadcasting of high quality institutions. We therefore construct a measure for the peripherality of the capital by relating the distance in kilometers from the capital to the approximative center of the country, to the distance from the center of the country to the border. As predicated by our model, the centrality of the capital indeed appears to be an important variable for explaining the variation in the Rule of Law.
We believe that the relationship between the location of the capital and the country-wide provision of public goods is a potential area for future research. 
